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Community Antenna Service-Unfair Competition?
Intermountain Broad. & T.V. Corp. v.
Idaho Microwave, Inc.1
Plaintiffs, Intermountain Broadcasting and Television
Corporation, KUTV, Inc., and Radio Service Corporation
of Utah, own and operate television stations KTVT, KUTV,
and KSL-TV, broadcasting out of Salt Lake City, Utah.
Defendant, Cable Vision, Inc., maintains two high-gain re-
ceiving antennas just outside of Twin Falls, Idaho by which
it receives and electronically treats selected signals which
are not otherwise receivable in Twin Falls and sends them
out by means of cables to the homes of individual subscrib-
ers in that city. Subscribers pay a "hook-up" fee of about
$100, plus a monthly service rate of approximately $4 to
$5. Defendant, Cable Vision, designed its antennas to han-
dle broadcasts other than those of the plaintiffs. However,
it announced plans to add new facilities to pick up and relay
plaintiffs' signals otherwise undependable to residents of
Twin Falls, and had begun soliciting subscribers for this
new community antenna service. Each of the plaintiffs
brought a separate suit against Cable Vision, Inc., and a
co-defendant Idaho Microwave, Inc., which had contracted
to construct the necessary equipment, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contended that defendants'
intended action of beaming their broadcasts to individuals
who lived in Twin Falls would be a misappropriation of
the fruits of plaintiffs' money, skill, and labor, and would
be "unfair competition" and "unjust enrichment" within
the meaning of International News Service v. Associated
Press.2 The Court denied plaintiffs' motions for summary
judgments and in refusing to grant declaratory relief, held
that "the relationship between the public, defendants'
microwave relay and plaintiffs' broadcasts are not similar
to or fairly comparable with the relationships in the Inter-
national News case."8
'196 F. Supp. 315 (S.D. Idaho 1961).
2 248 U.S. 215 (1918). In INS v. AP, the plaintiff and defendant were
competitors in the business of gathering and distributing news to their
member newspapers. INS had engaged in copying news from bulletin
boards and early editions of AP's member newspapers and then providing
it to its own members. The Court's order restrained INS from this practice.
1 Supra, n. 1, 328. The Court noted, however, that plaintiffs, "upon further
presentation may make a case for protection under copyright law, statutory
or common law, with respect to any programs which they themselves pro-
duce or for protection under the doctrine of unfair competition with respect
to any exclusive license arrangements which have heretofore been recog-
nized as ground for invoking that doctrine." Ibid.
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Before the INS case, unfair competition was categor-
ically defined as (1) infringing upon another's trademark,
or (2) deceiving the public by palming off one's goods under
the representation that they were the merchandise of a
competitor.4 The Supreme Court in the International News
case held that the misappropriation of another's product for
one's own use is an adequate basis for equitable relief and
the element of "palming off" is not essential to the doctrine
of unfair competition. The basic conception of the doctrine
of unfair competition was radically altered in that "[u]nfair
competition by the interpretation given it actually means
what its name indicates, and infringement of trademarks
has been relegated to its proper position as merely one of
the forms which this wrong may assume. '5  The case
seemed to introduce the idea of unjust enrichment into
the law of unfair competition.6
Justice Brandeis wrote a strong dissenting opinion in
which he viewed the majority as establishing a heretofore
unrecognized property right in "news." He stated, in es-
sence, that where the public interest may be affected,
courts should forebear from recognizing property rights
which have not been previously protected. He reasoned
that courts "are ill-equipped to make the investigations
which should precede a determination of the limitations
which should be set upon any property right in news ...
[and they] would be powerless to prescribe the detailed
regulations essential to full enjoyment of the rights con-
ferred or to introduce the machinery required for enforce-
ment of such regulation. * * *"7
Note, Unfair Competition: Application to News Service, 4 Cornell L.Q.
223, 225 (1919).
'Ibid. See Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) ; 2
CALLTMANN, UNFAr COMPETITION ANi) TR EMA S (2d ed,. 1950), 877, where
it is said that "[INS v. AP] represents a new development, for it recognized
the availability of an equitable remedy against unjust enrichment in the
field of competition, and thus broke the monopoly of the doctrine of
'passing off'."
6 "The basis of the decision is to be found in the relation between the
parties, rather than in a general property right of the complainant .... "
Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment
In The Law Of Unfair Competition, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 595, 597 (1942).
7Supra, n. 2, 267. Justice Holmes wrote in a concurring opinion that
'the only ground 'of complaint that can be recognized without legislation
Is the implied misstatement .... I Id., 248. The majority opinion stated,
"Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both
parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field,
we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them,
it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either
as against the public.
In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the controversy, we
need not affirm any general and absolute property in the news as such.
The rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of
property rights treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property
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Many courts have refused to extend the doctrine of the
International News case beyond the precise factual situ-
ation there presented,8 and "it has been repeatedly held,
almost ad nauseatum, that the Associated Press Case 'is
authority only for the situation there at bar'."9 It seems
reasonable to attribute much of this phenomenon to Justice
Brandeis' compelling dissent.10
The Court in the instant case seemingly aligned itself
squarely with those previously decided cases resting on
Justice Brandeis' dissent. However, Judge Sweigert went
a step beyond the Brandeis thesis in applying it to the facts
of the instant case. He noted that "there has been a plenary
exercise by Congress of the power to occupy and regulate
the field of television."" This is demonstrated by the fact
right." Id., 236. But see Callmann, supra, n. 6, 608-09, where it is stated
that, "For various reasons, I believe that the courts are the most desirable
agency to develop as well as to administer the law of unfair competition
* * * [and] a statute is too inflexible to furnish a satisfactory solution for
the innumerable and varied situations which will come up."
8 Many differences between the circumstances of the instant case and
those in the International News case were pointed out by the District
Court Judge in the final portion of his decision: (1) in the INS case the
plaintiff and defendant were identical businesses, here the plaintiffs and
defendants are not engaged in the same kind of enterprise; (2) in the
instant case the defendants' threatened practice does not interfere with
the primary purpose of plaintiffs-the dissemination of TV programs, the
practice of INS did so interfere with AP; (3) in the instant case defend-
ants' threatened practice does not interfere with plaintiffs at the point
where their profit is to be made (in fact, defendants' intended course of
action may further plaintiffs' possibilities of profit) ; (4) in INS an element
of deception was involved (Justice Holmes' implied misstatement), there
is no fraud on the public here; (5) the defendants in the Intermountain
Broadcasting case intend to relay plaintiffs' broadcasts at the same time
and in the same manner as was intended by plaintiffs. Finally, the Court
explained that plaintiffs conceded that the individual owners of TV sets
in Twin Falls could band together and do for themselves what defendants
plan to do for them, and because defendants plan to perform this service
for a profit, it does not follow that their actions constitute unfair
competition.
Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
See Speedry Products, Inc. v. Dri Mark Products, Inc., 271 F.2d 646,
649 (2d Cir. 1959) where, in discussing INS v. AP, the Court said that
"Because of the complexity of the facts the case is sWi generis";
National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 603(2d Cir. 1951) which states that INS v. AP "is authority only for the
situation there at bar, as has been over and over decided."
10 See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corporation, 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
In United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
it was said that "In the case of a business which was not recognized as a
public calling at common law, I believe it is sound policy to leave to the
legislature to determine whether the public welfare requires that all appli-
cants be served without discrimination"; and in Triangle Publications v.
New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 204 (D. Mass. 1942),
it was stated that, "I could hardly be unmindful of the probability that a
majority of the present justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
would follow the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Inter-
national News case ..
11 Supra, n. 1, 323.
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that Congress has gone so far as to specifically consider
amending the Federal Communications Act 2 to require
community antenna services to obtain the consent of orig-
inating stations to relay their programs. 13 Therefore, Judge
Sweigert reasoned,
"A cautious approach to recognition of novel rights
protectible upon the theory of unfair competition is
especially wise when the unjust practice complained
of occurs in a field over which the Congress has already
assumed a control sufficient to enable it, if it so chooses,
to regulate the practice one way or another in the
public interest."'"
Maryland does not appear to have moved beyond the
concept of unfair competition which prevailed before the
International News case. The Maryland case which best
analyzes the law of unfair competition is Edmondson Vii.
Theatre v. Einbinder16 in which the complainant, Edmond-
son Village Theatre, Inc., brought a bill in equity to enjoin
the defendant from using the name Edmondson Drive-In
Theatre. Complainant alleged that use of the name con-
stituted unfair competition. The Court found that there
was no evidence that defendant had been misleading any
patrons of complainant, and in the course of the opinion
stated: "The essential element of unfair competition is
deception, by means of which the goods of one dealer are
passed off as the goods of another... .'" The law in Mary-
land, therefore, is that the mere misuse of another's product
does not give rise to a cause of action-"palming off" on the
public is an indispensable factor.
-47 U.S.C.A. § 151.
1 Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Senate Rpt.
No. 923, p. 11, 86th Congr., 1st Sess. (1959).
" Supra, n. 1, 323. See also Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., supra, n.
10, 281, where it is said that "Judges have only a limited power to amend
the law; when the subject has been confided to a Legislature, they must
stand aside, even though there be an hiatus in completed justice."
208 Md. 38, 44, 116 A. 2d 337 (1955). See also Avalon Hill Co. v. Geb-
hardt, 224 Md. 52, 56, 166 A. 2d 740 (1960), where it was said that "The
appellant's case must stand or fall upon proof of a likelihood that the
ordinary purchaser would be confused . . ."; A. & H. Trans. v. Save Way,
214 Md. 325, 135 A. 2d 289 (1957) ; Nat. Shoe v. Nat. Shoes of N.Y., 213 Md.
328, 131 A. 2d 909 (1956) ; Bedding Corporation v. Moses, 182 Md,. 229, 34
A. 2d 338 (1943) ; Hecht Co. v. Rosenberg, 165 Md. 116, 166 A. 440 (1933) ;
Braiterman-Fedder Company v. Mauro V. Cardill, 156 Md. 699, 145 A. 338,
340 (1929).
16Id., 44. The United States District Court in Maryland has on two oc-
casions quoted this statement. Car-Freshner Corporation v. Marlenn Prod-
ucts Company, 183 F. Supp. 20, 42 (D. Md. 1960) and Bechik Products v.
Federal Silk Mills, 135 F. Supp. 570, 577 (D. Md. 1955).
RECENT DECISIONS
Twenty-four years after the International News deci-
sion, it still seems, in general, that the noted case, though
it found no unfairness present, took the best approach to
the problem of unfair competition by laying emphasis on
"unfairness". The element of "palming off" should be un-
essential, and the courts should be free to provide relief
where it is equitable to do so, unfettered by the notion
that the element of deception of the public is a prerequisite
to recovery. This policy, of course, does not necessarily




Administrative Law - Requirement Of Notice And
Hearing On Telephone Co. Tariffs. Bird v. Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co., 185 A. 2d 917 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1962).
Appellant sued the telephone company for the allegedly
negligent omission of his name and number from the alpha-
betical telephone directory. The Municipal Court restricted
appellant's recovery to $39 under a limitation of liability,
tariff provision, previously approved by the Public Utilities
Commission without notice and hearing. Appellant con-
tended that the Commission's approval of the limiting pro-
vision was invalid because such limitation operated as a
rate increase, which could be granted only after notice and
a hearing. The D.C. Municipal Court of Appeals, basing
its decision on statutory construction of the word "rate",
held that the statutory requirements binding on the Com-
mission as to regulation of the basic rate, viz. notice and
hearing, were inapplicable to regulations having only a
minor and indirect effect on the company's financial oper-
ation.
The Maryland Public Service Commission Law, unlike
the D.C. statute, broadly defines the word "rate", 7 MD.
CODE (1957) Art. 78, § 2(q). Although the definition of the
word "rate" in the Maryland Public Service Commission
Law appears broad enough to include this type of tariff
provision, the statutory procedure for establishing or chang-
ing rates, 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 78, §§ 68, 69, 70, does not
require notice and public hearing before such a rate change
can become effective. For a general reference see: Oppen-
heimer, Administrative Law in Maryland, 2 Md. L. Rev.
185, 203 (1938).
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